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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past decade, algorithmic decision systems (ADSs)—applications of 
statistical or computational techniques designed to assist human-decision making 
processes—have moved from an obscure domain of statistics and computer science 
into the mainstream.1  The rapid decline in the cost of computer processing and 
ubiquity of digital data storage have created a dramatic rise in the adoption of 
ADSs using applied machine learning algorithms, transforming various sectors of 
society from digital advertising to political campaigns,2 risk modeling for the 
banking sector,3 health care and beyond.4  In particular, many practitioners in the 
public sector have begun turning to ADSs as a means to stretch limited public 
resources amidst growing public demands for equity and accountability.5  
Advocates of these “intelligence-led” or “evidence-based” policy approaches 
assume big data tools will allow government agencies to use objective data to 
overcome historical inequalities to better serve underrepresented groups.6 
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However, the assumption of objective data is flawed.  All human behavior or 
social phenomenon that machine learning algorithms attempt to predict come from 
a data-generation process (DGP) which is comprised of trillions of complex 
interactions between the roughly seven billion people that inhabit our planet.  The 
DGP is often unseen to the analyst, but we make assumptions regarding this 
process by the choice of statistical models or the inferences we derive from our 
analysis.  Machine learning algorithms are often theorized and developed in cases 
of simulated data or data with outcome variables with little ambiguity in 
interpretation or method of collection.  However, if we assume incorrectly about 
the DGP, the predictions and conclusions we generate will be highly inaccurate.7  
Furthermore, because the “true” DGP is unseen, it is nearly impossible to 
determine whether a proposed measure captures the phenomenon or outcome of 
interest for decision-makers. 
Defining what is considered objective data is a particularly acute problem in 
criminal justice.  Dating back to the turn of the 20th century, statisticians and 
criminologists have raised concerns over the operationalization and measurement 
of crime.8  At its core, crime is a social phenomenon that has had multiple 
definitions and interpretations across time.  Since the early 1930s, the United 
States Department of Justice uniform crime reporting data—considered the official 
assignment of national crime patterns—are based on crimes known to the police, 
from reporting by the public or witnessed by members of law enforcement.9  While 
this operationalization of crime is reliable in the statistical sense (i.e. it will 
consistently measure the same concept over time), multiple scholars have pointed 
out this approach systematically undercounts crimes.10  These “hidden” or reported 
instances are often referred to as the “dark figure of crime.”11 
One of the most common reasons for the emergence of “dark figures” has 
been the policies and practices of individual police departments.  One of the first 
studies to make a linkage between systemic bias in the criminal justice system and 
measurement found that arrest data for delinquency of juveniles in New York State 
(defined as truancy, theft, or malicious mischief) was not a function of a person’s 
race or socioeconomic status directly—as previously theorized—but rather the 
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differential treatment of these individuals by the criminal justice system.12  Ronald 
Beattie in the 1940’s noted that in addition to demographic factors, police statistics 
were likely manipulated based on the local political conditions, often with a 
tendency to “report those facts which show a good administrative record on the 
part of the department.”13 
More recently, Steven Levitt analyzed crime victimization and reporting data 
and found that the likelihood of a crime being reported to the police increases as 
the size of the city’s police force increases.14  Ziggy MacDonald assesses the 
likelihood of reporting crime to law enforcement in the United Kingdom, and finds 
that non-white (except Asian residents), unemployed, and low-income residents 
were less likely to report crimes.15  A longitudinal study by Eric Baumer and Janet 
Lauritsen of crime reporting from the US National Crime Victimization Study 
(NCVS) between 1973 and 2005 found similar findings.16  While their study found 
increasing rates of reporting over time, non-white victims and male victims were 
much less likely to report crimes to the police.17  More surprising was that overall, 
“just 40 percent of the nonlethal violent incidents and 32 percent of the property 
crimes recorded in the national crime surveys during this period were reported to 
the police.”18  These findings would suggest that not only is the “dark figure” of 
crime very large, it is often unrepresentative of the overall picture of crime in a 
given area. 
Simply put, crimes recorded by the police departments are not a complete 
census of all criminal offenses, nor do they constitute a representative random 
sample.  Police records are actually a complex interaction between criminality, 
policing strategy, and community-police relations.  And, while the debate about 
how to measure and operationalize crime was previously confined to esoteric 
debates among academic criminologists, it has become more relevant as the use of 
criminal justice data has moved into the big data era.  The impact of poor input 
data on analysis and prediction is not a new concern—anyone who has taken a 
course on data analysis has heard the saying “garbage in, garbage out”—but in an 
era of an ever-expanding array of statistical models presented as panaceas to large 
and complex real-world data, we often forget to think carefully about the quality, 
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instead of simply the quantity, of our data sources.  As David Lazer and his 
colleagues point out, high quantity of data does not provide latitude to ignore 
foundational issues of measurement, construct validity, and dependencies among 
elements of our data.19 
This is particularly true for machine learning in criminal justice, as these 
models are heavily reliant on the training dataset to estimate predictions.  As I 
discuss below, machine learning algorithms are unaware, and in many cases, 
unable to adjust for institutional biases embedded within policing data.  As a result, 
the presence of bias in the initial (training) dataset leads to predictions that are 
subject to the same biases that already exist within the dataset.  Further, these 
biased forecasts can often become amplified if practitioners begin to concentrate 
resources on an increasingly smaller subset of these forecasted targets.  Thus, a 
failure to understand the limitations of data used in these predictive tools—and 
create more transparent and accountable mechanisms to mitigate these potential 
harms—may simply perpetuate historical discrimination toward underrepresented 
groups and violate their civil and human rights. 
 
II. CASE STUDY: PREDICTIVE POLICING 
 
One of the most popular and fastest growing ADSs in criminal justice are 
“predictive policing” tools, which are generally defined as applications designed to 
identify likely targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past 
crimes by making statistical predictions.20  Much like Amazon or Facebook’s use 
of consumer data to serve up relevant ads or products to consumers, police 
departments across the United States and Europe increasingly utilize software from 
Silicon Valley based companies, such as Predpol and Palantir, to identify future 
offenders, highlight trends in criminal activity, and even forecast the locations of 
future crimes.21  Police departments around the country are increasingly relying on 
a growing suite of predictive policing ADSs to more efficiently allocate policing 
resources amid shrinking public budgets and increasing pressure to be more 
responsive to the communities they serve.22  A recent survey of police agencies 
found that 70% planned to implement or increase use of predictive policing 
technology in the next two to five years.23  Outside the United States, European 
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cities such as Kent, London, and Berlin are considering the use of predictive 
policing (or pre-crime) tools to predict potential violent gang members.24 
While proponents of predictive policing have viewed this trend as a 
significant step towards transparency and pragmatic, data-driven policymaking, the 
use of predictive ADSs within police departments has also raised very serious 
concerns among activists and scholars regarding this new intersection between 
statistical learning and public policy.25  Civil liberties advocates have argued the 
growth of predictive policing means that officers in the field are more likely to stop 
suspects who have yet to commit a crime under the guise of historical crime 
patterns that are not representative of all criminal behavior.26  As Ezekiel Edwards 
of the ACLU noted, “It is well known that crime data is notoriously suspect, 
incomplete, easily manipulated and plagued by racial bias.”27  In their excellent 
report on predictive policing, David Robinson and Logan Koepke point out that 
reported crime data are “greatly influenced by what crimes citizens choose to 
report, the places police are sent on patrol, and how police decide to respond to the 
situations they encounter.”28  Legal scholars such as Joh note that, “Police are not 
simply end users of big data.  They generate the information that big data 
programs rely upon.  Crime and disorder are not natural phenomena.  These events 
have to be observed, noticed, acted upon, collected, categorized, and recorded—
while other events aren’t.”29 
Is there any evidence of these potential harms?  To date, there is only one 
empirical study to examine the impact of police-recorded training data on 
predictive policing models.  In their analysis, Kristian Lum and William Isaac 
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replicate the Epidemic-Type Aftershock Sequence or ETAS crime forecasting 
model outlined in a 2015 study by George Mohler and colleagues used 
commercially by the predictive policing vendor Predpol to generate predictions on 
model to publicly available data on drug crimes in the City of Oakland from 2009 
to 2011.30  In the study, the authors argue that the unrepresentative nature of 
recorded crime data could bias predictive policing forecasts in two ways.31 
First, the presence of bias in the initial training data leads to predictions that 
are subject to the same biases that already exist within the records.32  Because these 
predictions are likely to over-represent areas that were already known to police, 
police become increasingly likely to patrol these same areas and observe new 
criminal acts that confirm their prior beliefs regarding the distributions of criminal 
activity.33  Figure 1 below,34 reprinted from the original study, plots the estimated 
number of drug users in Oakland, California divided by 150 x 150 meter bins, with 
the greater intensity indicating a higher number of estimated drug users in a 
particular location.  As we see from the figure, the spatial distribution of drug users 
appears spread across the city, with elevated levels along International Boulevard, 
which is a primary thoroughfare in the City of Oakland.  This is compared to figure 
2,35 reprinted from the same study, which plotted the number of reported crimes 
across the city divided by bins and demonstrates a much more concentrated view 
as the recorded crimes seem to be exclusively isolated to neighborhoods around 
West Oakland and Fruitvale, two neighborhoods with largely non-white and low-
income populations.  Variations in the latter are driven primarily by differences in 
population density, as the estimated rate of drug use is relatively uniform across 
the city.36 
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Figure 1 
 
From these figures it is clear that police databases and public health-derived 
estimates tell dramatically different stories about the pattern of drug use in 
Oakland.  The important question is whether the predictions generated from the 
ETAS model are more closely aligned with the crime data or estimates from public 
health data.  Figure 3 plots the number of days each bin would have been flagged 
by Predpol for targeted policing, with greater color intensity indicating higher 
number of days targeted.37  Given the few number of bins targeted by the ETAS 
algorithm, it is clear the model failed to capture the larger spatial variation found in 
the public health data and more closely resembles the reported crime data.  Further, 
this narrower targeting led to a higher concentration of targeted policing among 
minority and low-income neighborhoods.38  As the authors note in applying the 
ETAS algorithm to crime data in Oakland, “Black people would be targeted by 
predictive policing at roughly twice the rate of Whites.  Individuals classified as a 
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race other than white or black would receive targeted policing at a rate 1.5 times 
that of Whites.”39 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Second, the newly observed criminal acts that police document as a result of 
these targeted patrols then feed into the predictive policing algorithm on 
subsequent days, generating increasingly biased predictions.40  This feedback loop 
or “ratchet effect” can lead to model over-fitting in that the locations most likely to 
experience further criminal activity are exactly the locations they had previously 
believed to be high in crime.41  In their study, Lum and Isaac attempt to address 
this issue by simulating a scenario of the application of the ETAS model where in 
addition to the observed Oakland crime data there is an additional 20% chance that 
additional crimes are found in the targeted bin for a given day.42  In this scenario, 
the study finds a dramatic increase in the predicted odds of targeting previous bins 
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2018] HOPE, HYPE, AND FEAR 551 
 
versus to non-targeted bins compared to the baseline example.43  This evidence led 
the authors to conclude the feedback scenario “causes the Predpol algorithm to 
become increasingly confident that most of the crime is contained in the targeted 
bins.”44  In short, the feedback mechanism is selection bias meets confirmation 
bias. 
 
Figure 3 
 
As the findings from Lum and Isaac make clear, crime data is not inherently 
objective and is ultimately reflective of institutional behavior and norms, and any 
predictive policing algorithm—not just Predpol’s ETAS algorithm—that fails to 
consider this limitation of recorded crime data will simply generate predictions that 
reproduce the embedded biases.45  That said, a few intentional decisions made by 
Predpol’s ETAS algorithm could lead to biased targeting that is unique to other 
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methods.  Specifically, the algorithm’s use of historical baselines means that 
neighborhoods which have been chronically over-policed will have higher baseline 
values in the initial estimates.  Biased targeting is further compounded when you 
consider that Predpol ranks the bins based on their conditional intensity scores and 
reports only small subset for targeted policing.  This means the top ranked bins are 
unlikely to change unless there is a dramatic surge in reported crime for an 
extended period of time.  The “stickiness” of the baseline values combined with 
the ratcheting effect from newly reported crimes would suggest that neighborhoods 
that have received disproportionate targeting from the police historically will 
continue to receive targeted policing under the ETAS model.  Further, the sticky 
baselines could also prevent the police from being alerted to small but noticeable 
upticks in crime in other neighborhoods, potentially making them less responsive 
to changing conditions in the community. 
Some critics of Lum and Isaac have questioned the appropriateness of using 
drug crime data for generating forecasts using Predpol’s ETAS algorithm, as 
Predpol has claimed their model has not been used for forecasting drug crimes,46 
but this claim fails on many fronts.  First, as the authors stated clearly in the study, 
drug crimes were used because it allowed for the use of public health data on illicit 
drug use to serve as a comparison against observations recorded by police 
departments, not because Predpol or other major predictive policing vendors were 
known to be widely forecasting drug crimes.47  Second, most major police 
departments use some form of “Hot Spot” policing tactics48—which serve as the 
theoretical foundation for predictive policing—to isolate areas where they believe 
drug activity to be occurring.  Lastly, despite predictive policing vendors’ claims, 
governments are interested in using predictive ADSs to target drug crimes.  For 
example, the National Institute of Justice included drug crimes as part of their 
recent $1.2 million crime forecasting challenge.49  And, local police departments 
have explicitly proposed using predictive policing for predicting the location of 
drug crimes and gang activity.50  With the increased concern within the Trump 
                                                                                                                                      
46  Jack Smith IV, (Exclusive) Crime-Prediction Tool PredPol Amplifies Racially Biased 
Policing, Study Shows, MIC (Oct. 9, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/156286/crime-prediction-tool-
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Randomized Controlled Trials, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317 (2005); Tanvi Misra, 
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www.citylab.com/equity/2017/08/what-this-map-of-salt-lake-citys-drug-hotspot-really-show/536214/ 
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https://nij.gov/funding/Pages/fy16-crime-forecasting-challenge-document.aspx [https://perma.cc/8N5
2-W5VH]. 
50  See Kate Ramunni, Hamden Police Using App, Eyeing Software to Help Fight Crime, NEW 
HAVEN REG. (Nov. 15, 2015, 8:18 PM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Hamden-
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Release, Hamden Police Department, Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) 
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administration about the growing opioid crisis,51 it is certainly reasonable to 
assume that more departments will look to predictive policing to help combat this 
issue. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Using predictive analytics in the real world is challenging, especially in high-
stakes policy areas such as policing.  However, this does not mean police 
departments should abandon the use of analytics or intelligence-led approaches to 
improve public safety.  Rather, it is important for police departments and other law 
enforcement agencies to think more broadly about the potential impacts of 
implementing algorithmic decision-support tools and ensure they create internal 
and external systems to promote public safety while minimizing disparate impacts.  
Specifically, police departments or any other agencies that attempt to implement 
algorithmic decision-support tools should take steps to develop internal and 
external accountability, ensure operational transparency, and be aware of the long-
run impact to the community. 
The process to accountable and transparent use of algorithmic decision 
support systems must start with community stakeholders and police departments 
discussing policing priorities and measures of police performance.  Currently, 
nearly all predictive policing systems are tasked with identifying neighborhoods or 
individuals determined to be high public safety risks, which departments then use 
to intervene with additional surveillance or negative enforcement actions (i.e. 
arrest or citation).52  However, these negative enforcement actions have been found 
to be “contagious” in communities targeted by police,53 leading to a deterioration 
of police-community relations and perpetuating the mass incarceration crisis in the 
United States.54  Moreover, police departments often use metrics such as arrests or 
citations for internal promotion,55 creating a perverse incentive for police officers 
to increase negative enforcement actions for institutional support.  Predictive 
policing and algorithmic decision-support systems not properly implemented will 
                                                                                                                                                      
Program: FY 2015 Local Solicitation (July 28, 2014), (http://www.hamden.com/content/219/
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only exacerbate the problem.  As Jessica Saunders, Priscilla Hunt, and John 
Hollywood discovered in their assessment of the implementation of the Strategic 
Subjects List (SSL) for the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the individual-level 
ADS tool was rarely used to prevent victimization from violent crimes, rather the 
authors found that CPD officers often used the SSL as a way to generate leads for 
unsolved shooting cases.56 
Yet, the promise of leveraging data to improve public safety also provides an 
opportunity to reform how we think about policing, and a growing number of 
innovative departments have started to pursue these alternative approaches.  For 
example, Toronto and other cities in Canada have moved toward the “HUB and 
COR” model of predictive policing which allow police departments to serve as a 
conduit to access other social services rather than demanding departments to 
respond to a myriad of social problems with a narrow range of enforcement tools, 
and reflects recent experimental studies that suggest targeted use of social services 
can be an effective strategy for reducing crime, particularly on violent crime 
among juveniles.57 
Under the “HUB and COR” model, a predictive model uses data collected 
from multiple governmental agencies to flag at-risk individuals (often minors) in 
need of urgent intervention by law enforcement.58  The individuals identified by 
the risk models are then vetted by representatives from various agencies and 
community groups, and the persons identified as high-risk will have “rapid 
response” plans tailored to each individual or family’s needs prior to more serious 
problems occurring.59  And, while civil society groups and journalists have rightly 
raised concerns about potential abuse of the system due to weak privacy 
protections such as personally identifiable information of the targeted persons,60 
new advances in blockchain technology—the algorithm that serves as the 
foundation to the cryptocurrency bitcoin61—could potentially allow HUBs to 
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generate predictive risk scores and identify at-risk persons in a manner which 
respects the privacy of persons in the datasets.62 
In addition to rethinking what officers do when deployed into communities, 
the big data era of policing also forces us to question how we measure successful 
police strategies.  The New York Police Department (NYPD) is taking an 
innovative approach to address the issue by moving away from measuring 
departmental performance based on enforcement actions—such as their pioneering 
CompStat model—and will instead measure performance based on large-scale 
community surveys sent out daily by the department.63  The surveys, which ask 
residents about their level of trust in the department and safety in their 
neighborhood, will be used to generate a precinct level “sentiment meter” score 
between 100 and 900.64  It is unclear if the NYPD has incorporated their sentiment 
scores into predictive policing models, but this approach does create the potential 
to allow police departments to tailor strategies around a measure that is 
independent of policing reporting practices and more closely aligns officer 
incentives to community needs.  The potential use of alternative measures could 
address some of the concerns about reporting biases, but the scale of such a data 
collection effort (50,000 respondents per day), raises concerns from civil liberties 
groups on the potential privacy issues, in addition to challenges that most survey 
researchers face to generate representative samples of residents will severely limit 
how many cities could adopt similar measures.65 
Another important question that must be addressed is whether ADS tools and 
their subsequent implementation actually lead to greater public safety and benefit 
to underserved communities.  To date, only three empirical studies of predictive 
policing has been published.  Saunders, Hunt, and Hollywood assess the Chicago 
Police Department’s SSL, a person-based predictive policing system created 
internally in 2013.66  The authors use ARIMA time series models to estimate 
impacts of the deployment of the SSL in 2013 on city-level homicide trends.67  
While the authors find a decline in city-level homicides overall, the introduction of 
the SSL failed to have a measurable impact.68  As the authors note, “the 
statistically significant reduction in monthly homicides predated the introduction 
of the SSL, and that the SSL did not cause further reduction in the average number 
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of monthly homicides above and beyond the pre-existing trend.”69  Hunt, Saunders, 
and Hollywood conducted a randomized control trial on the deployment of a 
predictive policing system in Shreveport, Louisiana, and found no statistically 
significant change in property crime in the experimental districts that applied the 
predictive models compared with the control districts.70 
The only study to find a statistically significant decline in reported crime is 
Mohler et al., which conducted a randomized control trial of Predpol’s ETAS 
model with the Los Angeles (United States) and Kent Police Department (United 
Kingdom).71  The authors used a novel randomization approach by randomizing 
between crime maps created by the ETAS algorithm and one generated by human 
crime analysts.72  Overall, the police patrols using ETAS forecasts led to an 
average 7.4% reduction in crime volume, while patrols based upon analyst 
predictions showed no significant effect on crime volume.73  While this reduction 
is crime volume is notable, Thomas suggests that the reduction in crime may have 
been spurious, as LAPD’s crime statistics show other divisions that were not using 
Predpol also saw crime reduction as high as 16% during the same period.74  Given 
these inconclusive peer-reviewed findings, some vendors point to internal testing 
done by departments themselves as evidence of the efficacy of predictive 
policing.75  However, Robinson and Koepke note that although “system vendors 
often cite internally performed validation studies to demonstrate the value of their 
solutions, our research surfaced few rigorous analyses of predictive policing 
systems’ claims of efficacy, accuracy, or crime reduction.”76 
The concerns about implementation and efficacy raise critical questions about 
the appropriate degree of transparency and regulation that algorithmic decision 
support tools should have.  Much of the concerns originally expressed by civil 
society groups and other skeptics of ADS tools were centered around opacity of 
the underlying algorithms which generate the predictions provided to law 
enforcement agencies.77  In response, many agencies have sought to move away 
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from third-party commercial vendors and opt for tools built in-house or in 
collaboration with universities.78  Newer predictive policing companies such as 
Civicscape have committed to algorithmic transparency by publishing a version of 
their source code on the online code repository Github and pledged to not use their 
tools to predict drug crimes because of concerns that the bias present in crime data 
are too difficult to model out of their predictions.79 
These efforts are certainly a laudable move toward transparency and 
accountability, although there are still important issues that need to be resolved.  
For example, a question that arises from the Civicscape transparency efforts is 
whether vendors should be responsible for defining what constitutes transparency, 
fairness, and oversight before policymakers set firm guidelines.  Under ideal 
circumstances, vendors or police departments would disclose their code for public 
scrutiny after each major release, but there is little incentive to continue their 
attempts at transparency as future iterations of the software are released, perhaps 
allowing biases to creep back in as more features or different data are included. 
The long-term success of ADS tools in criminal justice will depend on 
regulatory guidelines that can hold officials accountable and remove complex 
ethical decisions out of the hands of software developers, whose interests may not 
always be in alignment with the needs of the communities affected.  What would a 
regulatory system for ADS tools look like?  Shneiderman has outlined a three 
prong approach that could serve as a potential blueprint.80  In the article, the author 
outlines three kinds of AI oversight mechanisms, 1) a review board model where 
vendors or agencies should submit their tool or algorithm before any real world 
implementation, 2) continuous monitoring or auditing oversight reminiscent of 
what companies and non-profit foundations are required to do for financial due 
diligence, and 3) retrospective analysis of “disaster” scenarios much like the NTSB 
does after a plane crash by reviewing the black box data and internal governance.81  
One shortcoming of this approach is that it would be very resource intensive to 
carry out, and most police departments or city governments do not have the 
capacity to rigorously assess these algorithms in the manner outlined in the paper.  
However, an alternative approach would be for civil society groups to provide a set 
of best practices at the procurement stage (or proposal stage for in-house tools) and 
have a volunteer panel of civil society groups and university experts to prepare 
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oversight reports.  If we are successful in developing better guidelines for ADS 
tools, cities will both improve the quality of the data they collect and implement 
more transparent and inclusive processes to build safer communities for all of their 
residents. 
